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Information technology security policies are designed explicitly to protect IT systems. 
However, overly restrictive information security policies may be inadvertently creating 
an unforeseen information risk by encouraging users to bypass protected systems in favor 
of personal devices, where the potential loss of organizational intellectual property is 
greater.  
Current models regarding the acceptance and use of technology, Technology Acceptance 
Model Version 3 (TAM3) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology 
Version 2 (UTAUT2), address the use of technology in organizations and by consumers, 
but little research has been done to identify an appropriate model to begin to understand 
what factors would influence users that can choose between using their own personal 
device and using organizational IT assets, separate and distinct from “bring your own 
device” constructs. There are few organizations with radical demarcations between 
organizational assets and personal devices. One such organization, the United States 
Intelligence Community (USIC), provides a controlled environment where personal 
devices are expressly forbidden in workspaces and therefore provides a uniquely situated 
organizational milieu in that the use of personal devices would have to occur outside of 
the organizational environment. This research aims to bridge the divide between these 
choices by identifying the factors that influence users to select their own devices to 
overcome organizational restrictions in order to conduct open-source research. 
The research model was amalgamated from the two primary theoretical frameworks, 
TAM3 and UTAUT2, and is the first to integrate these theories as they relate to the 
intention to use personal or organizational systems to address the choices employees 
make when choosing between personal and organizational assets to accomplish work 
related tasks. Using survey data collected from a sample of 240 employees of the USIC, 
Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) statistical techniques 
were used to evaluate and test the model, estimate the path relationships, and provide 
reliability and validity checks.  
The results indicated that the Perception of Risk in the Enterprise (PoRE) significantly 
increased the Intention to Use Private Internet and decreased the Intention to Use 
Enterprise devices, as well as increasing the Perceived Ease of Use of Private Internet 
(PEUPI). The results of this study provide support to the concept that organizations must 
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do more to balance threats to information systems with threats to information security. 
The imposition of safeguards to protect networks and systems, as well as employee 
misuse of information technology resources, may unwittingly incentivize users to use 
their own Internet and devices instead, where enterprise safeguards and protections are 
absent. This incentive is particularly pronounced when organizations increase the 
perceived threat of risk to users, whether intentional or inadvertent, and when the 
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Insider threats have existed for millennia, acknowledged in the earliest known 
writings, including in the histories of Herodotus of Halicarnassus where he described 
Greek spies being spared by Xerxes (Herodotus & Grene, 1987). Sun Tzu also recognized 
insider threats in his famous treatise On the Art of War, where he identified five classes of 
spies, including “having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a 
district” and “having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy” (Sawyer & 
Sawyer, 1994, p. 67). Insider threats are nothing new, but the vastness of information that 
can be compromised by one trusted insider have increased exponentially since the advent 
of the Information Age. Indeed, Bickers (2000) cited the potential loss of company 
information as a restraining factor in beginning to conduct e-commerce. 
  Despite the multitude of historical examples, research into insider threats to 
information systems has long been neglected in favor of the perceived threats posed by 
external factors, such as viruses, worms, hackers, and others (T. Brown, 2018; Gordon & 
Loeb, 2002; Wang, 2019). This general trend continues, with recent research by Beckett 
(2015) indicating that while organizations have doubled their spending to protect 
themselves against the loss of information and systems, the vast majority of spending has 
been to harden systems against external threats. One potential reason for this divide is the 




damage caused by malicious insiders and therefore limit their exposure to the secondary 
and tertiary effects of losses (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009). 
Despite the focus on systems and processes for identifying threats to information 
systems against external threats, and the recognition of the threats posed by malicious 
insiders, a comprehensive and systematic review of the literature reveals there has been 
little study or effort to identify ways in which critical information can be exposed by non-
malicious insiders who use personal devices to conduct work related tasks outside of the 
organizational information systems infrastructure.  
Within intelligence agencies, there exists two distinct types of information: closed (or 
classified) sources and open sources. Closed sources consist of information collected in 
such a way that the origin, knowledge, or method by which the information is collected 
must be protected from disclosure (Richelson, 2018). Open sources consist of any other 
information that is available, such as websites, newspapers, magazines, subscription 
services, academic journals, Internet websites, and television broadcasts (M. Glassman & 
Kang, 2012). The Director of National Intelligence provided a formal definition of Open 
Source Intelligence (OSINT) in 2011 as “intelligence produced from publicly available 
information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an 
appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement” 
(H. Williams & Blum, 2018, p. ix). Despite the recognition of the value and use of 
OSINT for over 50 years, the United States government continues to evolve the definition 
and characterization of OSINT as both an intelligence discipline and what it consists of. 




mechanism by which OSINT is collected and reviewed by intelligence personnel (M. 
Glassman & Kang, 2012). 
Management and organizational restrictions regarding Internet usage within large 
organizations are common (Coles-Kemp & Theoharidou, 2010; J. Glassman et al., 2015; 
Schulman, 2001; Symantec, 2016). Management and organizational Internet restrictions 
within agencies of the U.S. government are managed by policies detailing ethical 
guidelines (Department of Defense, 2012), however, these restrictions impede the ability 
of intelligence analysts to conduct Internet based research (M. Glassman & Kang, 2012). 
These restrictions include prohibitions on “viewing, storage, copying or transmission of 
materials related to…illegal weapons, terrorist activities or any other illegal activities or 
activities otherwise prohibited” (Frederick, 2014, para. 8.7). Offensive, prohibited and 
resource intensive websites, such as video and audio streaming services, are frequently 
blocked by Web filtering tools (United States Cyber Command, 2020). These restrictions 
are specifically applicable to the unofficial use of IT systems, allowing for access to these 
materials and subjects for official purposes, but through practice and design, there are 
limited methods to differentiate between official and unofficial use except in ex post facto 
reviews (Frederick, 2014).  
There is a gap in the literature to understand the motivations and choices employees 
make to choose between enterprise systems and personal systems to accomplish work 
related tasks. Colvin described “non-malicious” information technology misuse as 
situations in which an “employee improvises, takes short cuts, or works around IT 
procedures and guidelines in order to perform their assigned tasks”(Colvin, 2016, p. 2). 




internal factors such as performance, intelligence analysts that wish to avoid lengthy 
review processes in which they have to justify accessing prohibited content, or 
burdensome processes required for requesting permission in advance, may choose to 
forego accessing potentially challenging materials while using government systems, 
opting instead to use personal devices and networks to access information, potentially 
exposing information unwittingly.  
These concerns are not purely speculative or remote. Advanced intelligence collection 
systems that act as a man in the middle attack on cellular telephones and devices, known 
colloquially as IMSI catchers and Stingrays, have been discovered near U.S. intelligence 
and defense facilities, lend credence to the concept that the use of personal devices may 
unwittingly expose information (Fleischer et al., 2018; Fredericks, 2018; Timberg, 2018). 
As a result, employees who fully comply with applicable restrictions while operating 
enterprise IT systems may unknowingly expose critical information by conducting 
research using personal equipment, such as at home or using mobile devices in order to 
accomplish work tasks. The use of personal Internet access devices, including such 
generally benign devices like fitness trackers, have revealed confidential and sensitive 
information (Ching & Singh, 2016; Lidynia et al., 2017). In 2018, a security flaw in a 
mobile fitness application revealed “6,400 users believed to be exercising at sensitive 
locations, including the NSA, the White House, MI6 in London, and the Guantanamo 
Bay detention center in Cuba, as well as personnel working on foreign military bases” 
(Whittaker, 2018, para. 10). In another example, the location of U.S. military personnel 
engaged in combat operations in Syria and Afghanistan were revealed through another 




posed by personal device usage, members of the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division 
were ordered to leave all personal electronic devices in the United States when they were 
deployed to Kuwait following hostilities with Iran (Rempfer, 2020). While the use of 
personal devices did not violate organizational policies (Sisk, 2018), nor did they involve 
organizational information systems, they exposed highly sensitive information to 
potential adversaries.  
 
Problem Statement  
Organizations that impose significant restrictions on Internet use increase the 
likelihood that employees will use personal devices outside of the organization to conduct 
work related tasks, which in turn, escalates information security risks (Gundu & 
Flowerday, 2012; Hovav & Putri, 2016). The use of Web filters and other information 
technology approaches to limit the accessibility of potentially inflammatory, 
objectionable, or ostensibly non work-related websites are largely effective in reducing 
employee misuse of information technology resources (J. Glassman et al., 2015); 
however, when access to Internet resources that are necessary to accomplishing work 
related tasks are restricted, these constraints may encourage employees to bypass 
organizational constraints by using their own devices and networks to access Internet 
based information. The use of personal devices and Internet resources to conduct work 
related activities increase the risk of information compromise (Garba et al., 2015; Hovav 






The purpose of this dissertation research was to assess the influence the perception of 
risk has on the behavioral intention and use behavior of personally-owned Internet 
devices and access to conduct open-source research among members of the United States 
Intelligence Community. Selected constructs derived from the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model (Venkatesh et al., 2003), the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Venkatesh et al., 2012) and validated extensions 
of UTAUT (Dwivedi et al., 2019) were used to establish a proposed structural path model 
to assess the impact the perception of risk has on user selection of enterprise or personal 
devices when conducting open-source research for work purposes. 
There have been extensive studies evaluating how, when, and why users accept and 
use technology. The two primary competing models reflect the differences between the 
organizational use of technology and how consumers use technology. The primary 
models used to understand how technology is used within organizations is known as the 
Technology Acceptance Model 3 (TAM3) (Venkatesh & Bala, 2008), which includes 
antecedents such as voluntariness, perceived ease of use, as well as perceptions of 
external control.  Recognizing that models developed to understand how well users 
accept technology they are required to use for employment and provided to them in an 
organizational environment is fundamentally different from technology users choose for 
their personal use, an alternative theory known as the Unified Theory of Acceptance And 
Use Of Technology (UTAUT) was developed and later extended into UTAUT Version 2 
(UTAUT2) (Venkatesh et al., 2003, 2012). UTAUT2 is similar in many ways to TAM3 




incorporating age, gender, and experience as moderating factors. While TAM3 is well 
suited to evaluating technology acceptance in organizations, UTAUT2 is generally better 
suited and designed to accomplish this for individual consumers. The UTAUT2 model is 
generally considered the most well-developed of the technology acceptance models 
focused on non-organizational use of technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003; M. Williams et 
al., 2015) 
Conceptually, this research attempted to bridge the gap between the various 
acceptance theories by examining what factors influence users to select personal Internet 
access devices over organizational systems to accomplish work related tasks. 
Additionally, this research incorporated the impact that the perception of risk, as a 
surrogate for security, has on the behavioral intention and use behavior of employees to 
avoid use restrictions and other barriers to accessing the Internet. This research model 
incorporated selected constructs as antecedents to behavioral intention and use behavior 
derived from the TAM3 and UTAUT2 models and well as the inclusion of attitude as 
codified in a revised UTAUT model (Dwivedi et al., 2019). The research model was used 
to investigate what effect organizational policies, along with perception of risk, have on 
users selecting between organizational resources and personal devices to conduct work 
related activities. 
The use of personal devices and systems to accomplish work related information 
gathering tasks likely does not pose a direct threat to information systems of an 
organization; however, the use of extra-organizational resources, such as personally 
owned smart phones or home computers, may introduce unintended risks to sensitive 




in which to examine the factors influencing personal device usage, as they are prohibited 
by law and policy from possessing or using personal devices within their work spaces 
(National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2017). This policy prohibiting the 
possession and use of personal devices allows for a clear demarcation between 
organizational IT devices and other situations wherein personal devices are not provided 
by the organization but are authorized for use, such as is the case with “Bring Your Own 
Device” (BYOD) situations where users are authorized to use their own devices to 
conduct work tasks (Hovav & Putri, 2016). 
By examining this unique population to determine whether the perception of risk 
inadvertently influences individuals to conduct work related activities using personally 
owned Internet access, a broader understanding of the impact of enterprise use policies 
has on organizations, including potentially exposing confidential information to 
adversaries, is realized (Fleischer et al., 2018; Fredericks, 2018; Timberg, 2018). 
Additionally, this research provides insights into user risk perception, allowing 
organizations to make informed decisions as to what Internet use policies are appropriate 
and develop remediation strategies to mitigate risks. 
 
Research Questions 
Open Source Intelligence, or the collection of information that is publicly available, is 
a frequent and routine function for intelligence analysts (M. Glassman & Kang, 2012). 
The most common method for conducting open-source research is through the Internet 
due to the vast amount of timely and accurate information available on a multitude of 




organizational and institutional Internet use policies that habitually prevent access to 
routine sources of information, often in the form of enterprise-wide restrictions (H. 
Williams & Blum, 2018). The ubiquity of the Internet and the ease in which intelligence 
professionals can conduct open-source research using their personal devices, and 
avoiding enterprise restrictions tempered by the perception of risk, forms the foundation 
for this research. The following primary research question was derived from the 
antecedents and moderating variables that comprise UTAUT2, TAM3, and related 
extensions of these theoretical models: 
RQ: What is the relationship between the perception of risk and how members of the 
US Intelligence Community intend to conduct open-source research? 
 
Relevance and Significance 
This study blended the foundational concepts found within TAM and UTAUT and 
applied them in a unique situation where the influences found in institutional aspects of 
accepting and using technology combine and contrast against a personal choice in 
selecting the use of personal Internet access devices to accomplish a work task in the 
form of conducting open-source research. The study population is highly segmented in 
terms of isolation from the use of personal devices at work locations, as BYOD is not 
only unavailable, but prohibited by policy and law. Therefore, the blurring of lines 
between personal and organization equipment and networks found with most study 
populations, such as corporate or academic situations, does not exist. The prohibition of 
personal devices within work spaces allows for a marked delineation between personal 




uncontrollable variables and more clearly identify the role the perception of risk plays in 
the selection of personal equipment to conduct open-source research in support of work-
related tasks. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
Several barriers and issues were addressed while conducting this research. The 
primary barrier that would have affected this study is the failure to acquire a sufficient 
number of quantitative samples. This barrier was mitigated by engineering a variety of 
pathways for survey subjects to respond, with each pathway serving as a potential 
complete source for responses. The pathways used to collect survey data included a 
commercial survey application on the Internet known as Typeform, Sharepoint survey 
tools hosted on a Department of Defense network known as the Secret Internet Protocol 
Router Network (SIPRnet) as well within an unclassified Department of Defense enclave 
linked to Typeform, each serving as a method to ensure the correct population is being 
sampled as well as ensuring the validity of the responses. The use of classified networks, 
primarily SIPRnet, introduced additional challenges, such as the ability to extract survey 
responses, but provided a milieu in which only Intelligence Community personnel can 
reply, ensuring the validity of the sample population. The use of the primary Intelligence 
Community network, known as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
System (JWICS), was considered but ultimately discarded due to significant challenges in   
extracting completed survey results. Combining samples to ensure a sufficient number of 





Another potential barrier was that the results would be unusable stemming from 
biases and other factors that would make the outputs unusable for analysis. This potential 
barrier was ameliorated through the use of validated survey questions, thoughtful survey 
design, pretesting, and conscientious administration of the survey.  
 
Limitations and Delimitations 
Limitations 
One of the primary limitations is the use of self-reporting as the primary mechanism 
for data collection. While self-reporting is a frequent and common method for 
organizational and management research, research has shown that responses can be 
biased towards socially desirable answers (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Additionally, 
significant variability exists between reported actions and their actual frequency of use 
(Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). 
The study was limited to members of the United States Intelligence Community 
(USIC), which encompasses personnel physically located around the world (Richelson, 
2018). As such, the location of the study was distributed, but through the use of 
controlled access to common platforms which only USIC members can access, this 
limitation was managed. The organizational culture of each organization of the USIC 
varies, and collection of demographic data, including the mission category of 
respondents, length of time in the IC, pay category, and other population demographics, 






This study was limited to members of the US Intelligence Community. The sample 
included staff, contractors, as well as military members. The study differentiated between 
members who use open-source materials in their work and those who do not.  
 
Definition of Terms 
Cybersecurity. Computing-based discipline involving technology, people, 
information, and processes to enable assured operations. It involves the creation, 
operation, analysis, and testing of secure computer systems. It is an interdisciplinary 
course of study, including aspects of law, policy, human factors, ethics, and risk 
management in the context of adversaries”(Burley et al., 2018, p. 919) 
Delphi method. “An iterative process to collect and distill the anonymous 
judgments of experts using a series of data collection and analysis techniques interspersed 
with feedback” (Skulmoski et al., 2007, p. 1) 
Information system. A “work system whose processes and activities are devoted to 
processing information, that is, capturing, transmitting, storing, retrieving, manipulating, 
and displaying information”(Alter, 2008, p. 453) 
Insider threat. “An insider can thus be defined with regard to two primitive 
actions: 1. violation of a security policy using legitimate access, and 2. violation of an 
access control policy by obtaining unauthorized access” (Bishop & Gates, 2008, p. 15:2) 
Open Source Intelligence. “…intelligence produced from publicly available 




appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement” 
(H. Williams & Blum, 2018, p. ix) 
Perceived risk. The assessment of an individual “composed of individual 
judgments regarding the likelihood that the unfavorable experience will happen, and the 
impact of that experience were it to happen” (Boss, 2007, p. 27) 
Risk. “A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential 
circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would rise 
if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (Barrett, 2018, 
p. 46)  
List of Acronyms 
APCO. Antecedents–Privacy Concerns–Outcomes 
AVE. Average Variance Extracted 
BI. Behavioral Intent 
BYOD. Bring Your Own Device 
CMB. Common Method Bias 
CMV. Common Method Variance 
DISL Defense Intelligence Senior Leader 
DOD. Department of Defense 
EO. Executive Order 




HTMT.  Heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) 
IC. Intelligence Community 
IDT. Innovation diffusion theory 
IMSI. International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
IP. Internet Protocol 
IRB. Institutional Review Board 
IS. Information System 
IT. Information Technology 
IUIPC. Internet Users Information Privacy Concerns 
JWICS. Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
MI6. Military Intelligence, Section 6 
MM. Motivation model 
MPCU. Model of PC utilization 
NSA. National Security Agency 
ODNI. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
OSINT. Open Source Intelligence 
PEUEI. Perceived Ease of Use of Enterprise Internet 
PEUPI. Perceived Ease of Use of Private Internet 




PLS-SEM. Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling 
PoRE. Perception of Risk – Enterprise 
PUEI. Perceived Usefulness of Enterprise Internet 
PUPI Perceived Usefulness of Private Internet 
SCT. Social Cognitive Theory 
SES. Senior Executive Service 
SIPRnet. Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
TAM. Technology Acceptance Model 
TAM2. Technology Acceptance Model Version 2 
TAM3. Technology Acceptance Model Version 3 
TOR. The Onion Router 
TPB. Theory of Planned Behavior 
TRA. Theory of Reasoned Action 
USIC. United States Intelligence Community 
UTAUT. Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology 
UTAUT2. Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology Version 2 






The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a research question, supported by 
presenting the background, research goals, relevance and significance, barriers and issues 
as well as potential limitations and delimitations for this research. The background 
established the pervasiveness of insider threats and the unwitting nature of potential 
compromises by users. The research goal identifies what this study aimed to accomplish 
and the research question focused and shaped the literature review. The relevance and 
significance section reinforced the problem statement and research goal while the barriers 
and issues sections identified potential concerns with the successful completion of this 
research. The limitations and delimitations identified issues that were recognized but 
were unable to be controlled, as well as the scope of the research population. The 
definition of terms and acronyms provides clear and unambiguous meanings to terms 






Chapter 2  
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction 
Within the study of information systems, the basis for why and how users accept 
technology is an extensively studied concept. These efforts have led to an evolution of 
various models and theories being developed and expanded over the years, primarily 
within organizational constructs. Previous studies examining how and when people use 
technology have largely approached the issue in a bifurcated manner, examining the use 
of technology in organizations and by consumers as discrete and separate (Venkatesh et 
al., 2012; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008) 
One of the most advanced and developed of these theories is the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), identified by Venkatesh et al. (2003). 
UTAUT aimed to incorporate the primary operant theory, the Technology Acceptance 
Model, with other predictive theories of acceptance to produce a “best of breed” 
amalgamated model that has a greater predictive value than the individual components 
(M. Williams et al., 2015).  Expanding on previous work, this model is well grounded in 
theory and provides for an understanding of the various concepts that influence 
acceptance, and includes performance expectation, effort expectancy, social influence and 
facilitating conditions as the primary factors that influence behavioral intention, leading 
to actual use. Affecting these primary determinants are key moderators of gender, age, 





Acceptance and Use Models 
While UTAUT has proven to be an excellent predictor of acceptance within 
organizational structures, its predictive capabilities have proven to be of less value when 
addressing consumer use contexts. To address these shortcomings, Venkatesh et al. (2012) 
developed an extension of the UTAUT model, known as UTAUT2. A brief review of the 
evolution of user acceptance models provides context to how UTAUT2 was developed, as 
well as how the conceptualization of privacy within the UTAUT2 framework comports to 
the foundational concepts previously established.  
The foundational concepts regarding user acceptance of technology are largely based 
on a theory from the social psychology discipline called the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA) which was developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1973). TRA proposes that a person’s 
behavior, referred to as actual behavior, is largely determined by a construct referred to as 
behavioral intent (BI) and defined as “a measure of the strength of one’s intention to 
perform a specified behavior” (Davis et al., 1989, p. 984). In 1986, Fred Davis took the 
theory of reasoned action and developed an adaptation of it specific to information 
systems, which was later known as the technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis, 
1985, 1989; Davis et al., 1989). His technology acceptance model, and its derivative 
works, have formed the bedrock of a vast amount of the scholarly research in information 
systems. 
As work with TAM continued through the 1990’s and into the 2000’s, the focus 
shifted to the task of better identifying variables by which to operationalize the constructs 
of TAM and to expanding the scope of TAM, including efforts to test the outer boundaries 




nationality (Adams et al., 1992; Y. Lee et al., 2003; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh 
& Davis, 2000). In 2000, Venkatesh and Davis published an expanded technology 
acceptance model, which sought to conceptually expand TAM by theorizing the 
determinate constructs which drive perceived usefulness and to explore some moderators 
of those constructs (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). 
In 2003, a group of researchers, including Davis and Venkatesh, embarked on an effort 
to combine TAM with theories of acceptance originating from other disciplines to create 
a model that would bring the best predictive capabilities of the various models together 
into one theory (Venkatesh et al., 2003). The eight theories that were amalgamated were 
the theory of reasoned action (TRA), from which TAM had been derived; TAM and its 
TAM2 extension; the motivational model (MM) taken from psychology; the theory of 
planned behavior (TPB), an extension of TRA; a combined TAM and TPB (C-TAM-
TPB); the model of PC utilization (MPCU), a native information systems theory that 
contrasts with TRA and TPB; social cognitive theory (SCT) taken from psychology; and 
finally, the innovation diffusion theory (IDT) taken from sociology (Venkatesh et al., 
2003). The researchers compared the constructs of each model and derived an 
amalgamation that had greater predictive value than the eight individual models. The 
resultant theory is known as the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology 





Figure 1  
 











Age Gender Experience Voluntariness of Use
 
Note. From “User acceptance of information technology: Toward a unified view” by V. 
Venkatesh, M. Morris, G. Davis, and F. Davis, 2003, MIS Quarterly, 27(3), p. 447. 
Copyright 2003 by MIS Quarterly. 
Each of the constructs included as antecedents to behavioral intention and use 
behavior is actually a combination of constructs derived from the eight extant theories 
that were combined into UTAUT. Each of these sub-constructs has its own scale items 
and brings predictive value to the constructs as a whole. Performance expectancy is 
defined as “the degree to which an individual believes that using the system will help him 
or her to attain gains in job performance” (Venkatesh et al., 2003, p. 447). Performance 
expectancy is derived from perceived usefulness, taken from TAM/TAM2 and C-TAM-




advantage, taken from IDT; and outcome expectations from SCT.  Effort expectancy is 
defined as “the degree of ease associated with the use of the system” (Venkatesh et al., 
2003, p. 450). Effort expectancy is composed of perceived ease of use from TAM/TAM2, 
complexity from MPCU, and ease of use from IDT.  Social influence is defined as “the 
degree to which an individual perceives that important others believe that he or she 
should use the new system” (Venkatesh et al., 2003, p. 451). Social influence consists of 
the subjective norm from TRA, TAM2, TPB, and C-TAM-TPB; social factors from 
MPCU and image from IDT. Facilitating conditions is defined as “the degree to which an 
individual believes that an organizational and technical infrastructure exists to support the 
use of the system” (Venkatesh et al., 2003, p. 453). Facilitating conditions consists of 
perceived behavioral control from TPB and C-TAM-TPB, facilitating conditions from 
MPCU, and compatibility from IDT (Venkatesh et al., 2003). In addition, UTAUT 
includes a complement of moderating variables including gender, age, and the 
moderating constructs of experience and voluntariness of use that were derived from 
TAM/TAM2.  These moderators are hypothesized to moderate various antecedents 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003). In 2012, recognizing that UTAUT possessed limitations in 
modeling technology adoption and use by consumers, the aspects of consumer affect, 
financial cost and automaticity were incorporated into a second version known as 
UTAUT2 (Venkatesh et al., 2012). Three additional constructs (hedonic motivation, price 
value and habit) were incorporated into UTAUT2 to more fully capture the variations 
between organizational and individual influences affecting technology adoption and use 




the study of user acceptance in the IS discipline in both organizational and individual 
settings. 
In 2008, Venkatesh and Bala introduced the Technology Acceptance Model 3 (TAM3) 
(Venkatesh & Bala, 2008). TAM3 introduces the new determinant constructs in two 
groups known as “the anchoring and adjustment framing of human decision making” 
(Venkatesh & Bala, 2008, p. 278). The anchors represent individual differences in 
“general beliefs associated with computers and computer use” (Venkatesh & Bala, 2008, 
p. 278). TAM3, in particular, provides a fully developed structure of the determinants left 
vague in the original TAM model, as shown in Figure 2. The TAM3 and UTAUT2 






Technology Acceptance Model 3 
Note. From “Technology acceptance model 3 and a research agenda on interventions.” By 
V. Venkatesh, and H. Bala, 2008, Decision Sciences, 39(2), 273–315. Copyright 2003 by 
Decision Sciences, by permission. 
 
Insider Threat 
Significant research has been conducted regarding the implementation and 
effectiveness of Internet use policies (Herath & Rao, 2009), Web filtering and other 




behavioral and motivational pressures (Willison & Lowry, 2018), all which have 
undoubtably decreased misuse of information technology systems (D’Arcy & Devaraj, 
2012). However, there is limited research as to what effect these policies have on users 
avoiding using provided enterprise information systems in order to more efficiently 
access information, leading to what might be referred to as a non-malicious extra-
organizational insider threat. 
While a seemingly simple term to describe, the term "insider threat" has met with 
numerous definitions over the years aiming to categorize and better convey what is meant 
by the phrase. At its core, an insider threat consists of two components: access and intent, 
but as intent is generally not observable until some action has been taken, the definition 
has evolved over the years (Willison & Lowry, 2018). Initially, the term derived its 
context from physical protection measures taken by a number of industries, including 
banking, accounting, and sales that were more focused on protecting money and property 
than less tangible intellectual assets (Brackney & Anderson, 2004). In contrast, 
governments have always had an interest in protecting intellectual property from being 
lost, stolen, or otherwise exposed. As a result, it is not surprising that the earliest studies 
relating to insider threats, including how to bound the definition, were primarily a result 
of government-funded research (Baram et al., 2017). 
Bishop (2005) proposed the term insider threat be defined as “a trusted entity that is 
given the power to violate one or more rules in a given security policy... the insider threat 
occurs when a trusted entity abuses that power” (pp.77-78). While this addresses both 




definition with more expansive language that aimed to differentiate between the specific 
actions taken by users with authorized access (Bishop, 2005).  
In 2008, Bishop, working with Gates, again addressed the definition of insider threat 
in an effort to standardize the terminology to provide increased accuracy and reliability 
when evaluating research towards the detection of threats from insiders (Bishop & Gates, 
2008). They note that without a consistent definition of the term, each researcher 
implicitly expects the reader to comport to a common understanding of the term, but that 
these definitions are often influenced by unique experiences, knowledge, assumptions, 
and data. Consequently, Bishop and Gates proposed that insider threats are best defined 
by the constraints imposed by both access control rules and a security policy: “An insider 
can thus be defined with regard to two primitive actions: 1. violation of a security policy 
using legitimate access, and 2. violation of an access control policy by obtaining 
unauthorized access” (Bishop & Gates, 2008, p. 15:2). Additional studies reinforce the 
concept that insider threats are the result of trusted insiders violating access control rules 
and policies (Greitzer et al., 2008), whether maliciously or not (Colvin, 2016). 
Continuing the theme that access and policy are guiding elements when determining 
how to define insider threats, as well as the potentiality of the loss of data, the United 
States Department of Defense (DoD) categorizes insider information security incidents as 
either infractions or violations (Department of Defense, 2013). DoD Manual 5200.01 
defines infractions as “a security incident involving failure to comply with requirements 
which cannot reasonably be expected to, and does not, result in the loss, suspected 
compromise, or compromise of classified information. An infraction may be 




are more serious and are defined as “security incidents that indicate knowing, willful, and 
negligent disregard for security regulations, and result in, or could be expected to result 
in, the loss or compromise of classified information” (Department of Defense, 2013, p. 
86). 
Despite these various definitions, the use of personal information systems to access 
publicly available information does not meet the current definitions generally applied to 
insider threats, since no explicit policies would be violated nor would access to the 
organizations information systems be compromised. One early definition for insider 
threats of “malevolent (or possibly inadvertent) actions by an already trusted person with 
access to sensitive information” may be appropriate (Brackney & Anderson, 2004, p. xi). 
However, the combination of two factors, namely the association of the individual with a 
specific organization, such as the U.S. Intelligence Community and specific search terms, 
topics or focus used while conducting extra-organizational research could provide 
adversaries indications and warning regarding information of interest as well as more 
specific actionable information. 
 
Privacy, Trust, and Risk 
An employee conducting extra-organizational research is largely relying on a 
common, and generally considered unwise, approach to privacy by depending on being 
able to hide in the noise and volume of information, also known as “security through 
obscurity” (Hartzog & Stutzman, 2013, p. 21). In isolated cases, this approach may make 
sense, especially when available identifiers, such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, are 




information elements are present and able to be associated with an individual or an 
organization, such as mobile telephone international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) 
numbers, hardware addresses, email and physical addresses, phone numbers, and other 
identifiers, the scant protections offered by security through obscurity are lost (Hartzog & 
Stutzman, 2013; Kehr et al., 2015).   
While the concept of privacy has been extensively studied, a universally accepted 
understanding of what constitutes privacy has proven to be an elusive quarry (Culnan & 
Armstrong, 1999; Solove, 2008). The concept of privacy encompasses many dimensions 
and elements, including “the right to be left alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 193), as 
an element of human dignity (Bloustein, 1964), or as Westin described information 
privacy, the ability for entities to “determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967, p. 7). Despite 
the lack of a common definition or even a single coherent understanding of the concept, 
privacy can be described, in a simplified manner, as the absence of intrusion. Similar to 
how Justice Potter of the United Supreme Court defined pornography as “I know it when 
I see it” (Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184, 1964, p. 197), an invasion of privacy is readily 
apparent to those affected when they are aware it has occurred (Dinev et al., 2013). 
Information privacy, as it relates to privacy and the use of technology, is well grounded 
by Dinev et al.’s (2013) definition: “an individual’s self-assessed state in which external 
[parties] have limited access to information about him or her” (p. 299). 
The concept of privacy, sometimes also referred to as trust, has been approached in a 
number of ways within the literature, including as a contextual relationship within the 




expectancy and facilitating conditions (Venkatesh et al., 2011), but generally not as an 
independent moderating factor. Other works, such as Dinev et al’s (2015) expanded 
Antecedents–Privacy Concerns–Outcomes (APCO) approach recognizes the impact 
privacy plays in individuals’ choices, which is not reflected in current technology 
acceptance models. There have been a number of studies that focus on incorporating 
privacy as a factor within the UTAUT models, generally focusing on the intention to use 
specific technologies, such as near-field communication (Morosan & DeFranco, 2016), 
social media messaging (Lai & Shi, 2015), and the sharing of user generated content 
within social media platforms (Herrero et al., 2017), among others.  These studies 
generally focus on privacy as a barrier or impediment to the use of existing technology. 
Another specific factor that impacts user acceptance of technology as well as privacy 
that is generally unique among intelligence professionals is compliance with information 
collection processes regarding the collection and use of information created by or about 
United States citizens, residents and corporations as codified in United States Presidential 
Executive Order 12333 (Executive Orders, 2016). This order directs intelligence activities 
of the United States to avoid collecting, retaining or disseminating any information 
regarding or identifying any United States person if collected through intelligence 
channels. The largest organization that collects intelligence information in the United 
States is the Department of Defense, which implements EO 12333 through Department of 
Defense Manual 5240.01, which provides procedures governing the conduct of DOD 
intelligence activities (Carter, 2016). Within DOD Manual 5240.01, it specifically states 
that if information is publicly available regarding United States Persons, there are no 




subordinate organizations (H. Williams & Blum, 2018), and may affect the perception of 
risk experienced by members of the study population.  
Privacy and risk are increasingly important aspects in understanding the causal and 
indirect factors affecting the selection, use, and discontinuation of technology in all its 
forms, including hardware, operating systems and applications (Harborth & Pape, 2019; 
Ho et al., 2017). A study undertaken by Harborth and Pape (2019) examined what 
“…influence have privacy concerns and associated trust and risk beliefs on the behavioral 
intention and actual use of Tor?” and “What influence does trust in Tor itself have on the 
behavioral intention and the actual use?” (p. 4852), finding that only the degree of trust in 
privacy enhancing technologies, in this case the anonymizing network known as Tor, 
affected the behavior intention to use the technology. While this study based its research 
on the Internet Users Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) model by Malhotra et al. 
(2004) as opposed to the TAM3/UTAUT2 models, it used a structural model containing 
numerous relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables to analyze the 
cause and effect relationship between unobserved latent variables with Partial Least 
Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) in an effort to estimate behavioral 
intention (Harborth & Pape, 2019). A study by Karwatzki et al. (2018) also examined the 
concept of risk and the impact on behavior intention, developing a nomological network 
model focusing on the antecedents of privacy experience and familiarity affecting privacy 
risks, which is represented by a seven-dimensional construct of the various ways privacy 
invasions affect individuals, such as physical, social or psychological effects. This study 
used PLS-SEM to empirically assess “how privacy risks influence individuals’ 




conceptualization of privacy risks as a multidimensional construct incorporating the 
various ways an individual could be affected by an invasion of privacy and the impact on 
use intention to be well grounded. Other work researching the impact of the awareness of 
information security threats on privacy protective behaviors, such as password strength 
and non-disclosure of information, which is a suitable proxy for the behavior intention to 
use technology, found that while awareness of threats significantly affected both 
disclosure and protective measures such as password complexity, privacy self-efficacy 
was not positively associated moderating the impact of security threat awareness 
(Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2018). Mamonov and Benbunan-Fich’s (2018) study used 
PLS-SEM to assess the structural path and relationships between the reflective construct 
of the awareness of information security threats and the moderating impact of privacy 
self-efficacy on disclosure behavior and password strength selection.   
Cloud computing, where data is physically and logically stored in locations not under 
the individual (or an organizations) immediate control, introduce further opportunities to 
examine the causal effect of perceived risk on both trust and intention to use technology 
(Ho et al., 2017). Ho et al. (2017) examined perceived risk and subjective norms within 
cloud computing adoption and established a research framework based on the theoretical 
foundations found in TAM, but with the modification of intention to use towards 
intention to trust as the dependent variable, with the independent variables of knowledge, 
attitude and perceived behavioral control with subjective norms and perceived risk as 
both independent and moderating variables. This study on the impact of perceived risk 
and subjective norms on cloud adoption used PLS-SEM to “identify and explain the 




that both perceived risk and subjective normal have a significant effect on cloud 
computing adoption 
The research model for the current study is presented in Figure 3. It is holistically 
comprised of constructs derived from Venkatesh et al’s (2003, 2012) Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology Versions 1 and 2 and Venkatech and Bala’s (2008) 
Technology Acceptance Model Version 3, research on information privacy by Culnan and 
Armstrong (1999), Dinev et al. (2013), Kehr (2015), as well as recent work by Dwivedi 
et al. (2019) to validate and extend UTAUT’s primary constructs to include the impact 
they have on behavioral intention and use behavior. The perception of risk, and its 
association with privacy, is a significant factor regarding the use of technology (Dinev et 
al., 2013), and impacts the performance expectancy, perceived ease of use and behavioral 
intention to use information systems. By incorporating the perception of risk into the 







The Research Model 
 
Hypotheses 
The following hypothesis were formulated for this study: 
H1a: Perception of risk will have a positive effect on the perceived ease of use of 
private Internet access. 
H1b: Perception of risk will have a negative effect on the perceived ease of use of 





H2a: Perception of risk will have a positive effect on the perceived usefulness of 
private Internet access. 
H2b: Perception of risk will have a negative effect on the perceived usefulness of 
enterprise Internet access. 
 
H3a: The perception of enterprise risk will have a direct relationship with the intention 
to conduct Internet based research using Private Internet access for OSINT 
related work activities.  
H3b: The perception of enterprise risk will have a direct relationship with the intention 
to conduct Internet based research using Enterprise Internet access for OSINT 
related work activities. 
 
H4a: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access positively influences the 
perceived usefulness of private Internet access. 
H4b: Perceived ease of use of enterprise Internet access positively influences the 
perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access. 
 
H5a: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access positively influences employees’ 
intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work activities. 
H5b: Perceived ease of use of enterprise Internet access negatively influences 





H5c: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access negatively influences employees’ 
intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work activities. 
H5d: Perceived ease of use of enterprise Internet access positively influences 
employees’ intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work 
activities. 
 
H6a: Perceived usefulness of private Internet access positively influences employees’ 
intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work activities. 
H6b: Perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access negatively influences 
employees’ intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work 
activities. 
H6c: Perceived usefulness of private Internet access negatively influences employees’ 
intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work activities. 
H6d: Perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access positively influences 




A comprehensive review of the literature was performed to provide the baseline of 
extant knowledge of user acceptance of technology theory, the evolution of those theories 
over time, an understanding of how these theories were developed and shaped by shifting 
usage patterns of information technology over time, the role insiders have as a threat 




literature provides numerous examples of the various methods developed over time to 
assess both the adoption of technology within organizations and well as by individuals. 
The literature establishes that organizational and individual acceptance and use constructs 
vary significantly due to both the obligatory nature of institutional requirements as well 
as the vagaries of the human condition affecting individual choices. The primary 
construct which will be under evaluation in this study, the perception of risk, is 
incorporated obliquely in both TAM3 and UTAUT2 through the effort expectancy and 
facilitating conditions constructs, but as risk perception becomes increasingly relevant to 
the acceptance and use of technology by individual consumers, more research is required 
to understand the factors by which these decisions are made. A review of 
contemporaneous studies examining the impact of privacy and perceptions of risk on 
behavior and use intentions of technology reveals that due to the latent variables inherent 
in reflective constructs, the use of Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling 
(PLS-SEM) statistical techniques to examine this phenomenon is well grounded in theory 





Chapter 3   
Methodology 
 
This chapter details the research methodology designed to answer the primary 
research question: “What is the relationship between the perception of enterprise risk and 
how members of the US Intelligence Community intend to conduct open-source 
research?”. This chapter includes a detailed description of the research design, data 
collection techniques, instrument development and validation, and data analysis 
processes used. A summary is provided to synthesize the overall methodological 
approach. 
 
Overview of Research Design 
In order to develop empirical support within a modified UTAUT/TAM framework, 
this study employed an exploratory research design using survey instruments to collect 
quantitative data to examine the impact of the perception of enterprise risk on the 
selection and use of private or organizational assets to conduct Open Source Intelligence 
research. A quantitative approach allowed this study to minimize the effects of bias that 
may affect the hypotheses through statistical analysis techniques (Plonsky & Gass, 2011). 
The use of a structural path model based on fundamental theory and described in Figure 
3, which specify how the latent variables are related to one another as well as the impact 
on the dependent variable, will provide the opportunity to estimate complex cause and 




The research was conducted in three phases. During the first phase, the survey 
instrument was developed following a comprehensive review of literature and construct 
validity and reliability validated against a panel of nine experts recruited from academia, 
industry and government agencies specializing in information security, cybersecurity and 
related disciples. The titles, professional associations, areas of concentration, years of 
experience, and the gender of the Delphi panel members are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1  
 
 








Professor Academia Information Systems 15+ Male 
Professor Academia Information Systems 20+ Male 
Director Industry Open-Source Research/Training 20+ Male 
Professor Academia Information Systems 10+ Female 
Intel Officer Government Cyber Threat Analysis 20+ Male 
Researcher Academia Information Security 20+ Male 
Professor Academia Information Systems 15+ Male 
Professor Academia Information Security 15+ Female 
Director  Industry Cybersecurity 30+ Male 
 
The survey instrument was refined based on feedback from the Delphi panel and 
validated scales from previous studies, which according to Hair et al.(2010) is consistent 
with established best practices. A pre-test was used to increase confidence and ensure 
respondents understand the survey questions (Oksenberg & Kalton, 1991) and were 
examined to minimize issues related to instrument validity, including content and 
construct validity as well as reliability as identified by Straub (1989). Ex ante power 
analysis was conducted prior to the data collection to ensure adequate statistical power 




survey instrument and validation, an online survey was provided to members of the 
United States Intelligence Community through a variety of platforms, receiving 240 valid 
responses. This survey and invitations to participate were approved for posting on US 
government systems, which increased the quality and quantity of responses.  
The study population, the United States Intelligence Community that conducts 
analysis and uses Open Source Intelligence, is small enough (IC EEO, 2019) that the 
population is likely to not be normally distributed and it is unlikely that obtaining sample 
sizes necessary for confirmatory analysis processes used in covariance based statistical 
analysis would have been possible. Based on the size of the samples from the study 
population, the character of the structural path model and the exploratory nature of this 
proposed research, analysis was conducted through the use of Partial Least Squares 
Structured Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) (Hair et al., 2010, 2017; Mamonov & 
Benbunan-Fich, 2018). The use of PLS-SEM is widely recognized as a valid method in 
both the information systems and business disciplines and is best used on small sample 
sizes when developing and evaluating theories (Hair et al., 2010, 2019; Khan et al., 
2019).  
Instrument Development 
For the dependent variables of the intention to use privately or enterprise owned 
Internet access to conduct open-source research, the measure introduced by Brown and 
Venkatesh (2005) was adopted. Davis’s (1989) measures regarding ease of use and 
usefulness were adjusted to the context of private Internet access devices and enterprise 
provided Internet access, with the constructs referring to completing Open Source 




comparison. The perception of risk measures were adapted from Lee’s (2009) measures 
of performance and security risks and the facilitating conditions measures were adapted 
from Hong et al.’s (2011) measures facilitating conditions in the acceptance of agile 
information systems. The measures for facilitating conditions and perception of risk for 
privately owned devices and Internet were not incorporated into the research model. The 
instrument also collected Diener et al.’s (1985) “Satisfaction With Life Scale” as a marker 
variable to implement the partial correlation procedure in the event common method bias 
was indicated (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All measures were assessed using a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from completely agree to completely disagree, except one excluded 
indicator which included a binary choice between the intention to use enterprise or 
private Internet. Table 2 shows an overview of the measurement instruments that were 
used. 
Table 2  
 






POR1: I would not feel safe using my work provided devices and Internet 
to do open source research.  
POR2: I’m worried that using my work provided devices and Internet to 
research work topics could cause me problems. 
POR3: I would not feel secure using my work provided devices and 
Internet to research publicly available websites from other countries.  
(M.-C. Lee, 
2009) 









If I used [enterprise provided Internet access / my own Internet access at 
home] for work related Internet research… 
 
PE [E/P] 1:…learning how to operate the Internet browser would be easy 
for me. 
PE [E/P] 2:…I would find it easy to find the information I was looking for.  
PE [E/P] 3:…my interaction with the applications would be clear, effective 
and flexible. 
PE [E/P] 4:…it would be easy for me to become skilled at open source 
research. 















Using [enterprise provided Internet access / my own Internet access at 
home] for work related Internet research… 
 
PU [E/P] 1:…would enable me to accomplish Internet research more 
quickly. 
PU [E/P] 2:…would improve my job performance. 
PU [E/P] 3:…would increase my productivity. 
PU [E/P] 4:…would enhance my effectiveness. 
PU [E/P] 5:…would make it easier to do my job. 
PU [E/P] 6: I would find using my own Internet access at home /at work 
useful to do work related Internet research. 
(Davis et 
al., 1989) 









PIAW1: I intend to use my [enterprise/personal] Internet access to do 
Open Source research within the next two months.  
PIAW2: I predict that I will use my [enterprise/personal] Internet access 
for Open Source research in the next two months. 
PIAW3: I expect that I will use my [enterprise/personal] Internet access 
for work in the next two months. 
PIAW4: Within the next two months, I am likely to use my 







FC1: I have the technical resources to use [enterprise provided/personal] 
open source Internet research tools on the Internet. 
FC2: I have the knowledge necessary to use [enterprise provided/personal] 





Validity and Reliability 
The measurement items have been selected from previously validated studies, with 
most slightly modified to suit the information assurance nature of this inquiry, which 
provides fidelity of measurement (Mowbray et al., 2003).  The survey instrument was 
tested to ensure it meets acceptable levels of validity and reliability, as well as 
comparisons to previously validated measurements. The model was evaluated using 
convergent validity, collinearity between indicators and the significance and relevance of 
outer weights (Hair et al., 2017). Additionally, the structural model was evaluated using 
the coefficients of determination (R2), predictive relevance (Q2), the size and significance 
of path coefficients, as well as f2 effect sizes (Hair et al., 2017, 2019). 
Validity 
Salkind (2011) described internal validity as “the quality of an experimental design 




variable, whereas external validity is the quality of an experimental design such that the 
results can be generalized from the original sample and by extension, to the population 
from which the sample originated” (p. 148-149), while Gay and Airasian (2003) 
described validity as “the degree to which a survey measures what it is supposed to 
measure” (p. 23). Instrument validation is defined by Straub (1989) as the “prior and 
primary process in confirmatory empirical research” (p. 162). Together, these efforts 
describe the effect of validity on the quality of research and the generalizability of the 
results.  
Reliability 
Reliability relates to the degree in which the results of a study can be replicated, i.e. 
different researchers are able to reach the same or similar result (Carmines & Zeller, 
1979). One measure of reliability found in the literature and widely used is Cronbach’s α, 
which is used to determine the internal consistency and provides a summary measure 
based on the correlation of a given scale (Cronbach, 1951). As a result of Cronbach’s α 
being readily discernable, and easily understood, it has been adopted as the prevailing 
method to determine reliability. More recent studies have called for the abandonment of 
this measure in favor of more dynamic analysis such as convergent reliability (Bonett & 
Wright, 2015; Hair et al., 2017), with studies indicating that “Cronbach’s alpha is both 
unrelated to a scale's internal consistency and a fatally flawed estimate of its reliability” 
(Peters, 2018, p. 56). In addition to Cronbach’s α, this study examined content validity 
before collecting data, and following data collection, convergent validity, the significance 
and relevance of indicator weights, and the presence of collinearity amongst indicators to 





Initial data collection focused on a Delphi panel of nine experts recruited from 
academia, industry and government agencies specializing in information security, 
cybersecurity and related disciplines, with the intent to form a consensus of the study’s 
content, face validity, and reliability, with multiple iterative rounds necessary to achieve 
consensus. When there is a clear basis in literature from which to establish the survey 
instrument, a two round Delphi is often suitable, but additional iterations were necessary 
to resolve concerns (Dalkey et al., 1970). According to Akins et al. (2005), a Delphi panel 
consisting of a relatively small number of experts achieves reliable outcomes when strict 
inclusion methods are employed. The Delphi method is generally considered a quick, 
inexpensive, and relatively efficient method to ensure consensus regarding a topic or 
process that require individual judgements (Powell, 2003).  
The Delphi group was provided the proposed survey instrument through the online 
Google Forms tool, which provided the opportunity to solicit qualitative responses, 
allowing for anonymous but secure participation and discussion within the Delphi group, 
both between the researcher and other participants, which is an established best practice 
(Akins et al., 2005). The Delphi panel identified several questions relating to perception 
of risk which were inadvertently reverse coded, e.g. “I would feel safe...” as opposed to 
“I would not feel safe…” and were subsequently corrected. The Delphi panel discussed 
the potential for social desirability to influence to the results, but ultimately decided that 
the anonymity protections provided sufficient mitigation of these concerns. Several 




were identified as being unnecessary as was the case in several demographic questions 
adopted from other survey instruments, including respondent’s sexual preference.   
Upon completion of the Delphi panel, the survey was provided through secure 
government information system enclaves to members of the United States Intelligence 
Community who use open-source intelligence as part of their work functions. Due to the 
nature of the secure government information system enclaves, the study population is 
isolated, ensuring population integrity. Survey responses, along with appropriate 
demographic information, was collected through the use of Typeform, an online survey 
tool which provides a secure, customizable, and easily accessible data collection process, 
as well as a mirror of the survey hosted by Sharepoint available with each government 
enclave (Security at Typeform, 2020). All data collected were anonymized, password 
protected and secured with multi-factor authentication to ensure the confidentiality and 
integrity of the responses and to ensure only study personnel had access. 
Population and Sample 
This study population was limited to members of the US intelligence community. The 
sample included staff, contractors, as well as military members. For the purposes of this 
study, members of the United States Intelligence Community are defined as individuals 
employed, assigned, attached or working on behalf of any of the 17 separate United 
States government intelligence agencies that conduct intelligence activities in support of 
the national security of the United States (Richelson, 2018). The United States 
Intelligence Community consists of entities that encompass a broad range of 
specializations and missions, broadly categorized into national intelligence (Central 




National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), defense and military intelligence (Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the service specific intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Marines and Coast Guard) and civilian intelligence agencies (Department of State, 
Department of Energy, Department of Treasury, Department of Homeland Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency) (Richelson, 2018). 
Sample Size 
According to Hair et al. (2017), a recommended sample size of 26 observations would 
be needed to arrive at a statistical power of 80% for observing R2 value of at least 0.50, 
accounting for a 1% error probability, based on 5 independent variables. The R2 values 
reported in the studies used to develop the instrument were identified to determine the 
minimum values for endogenous constructs to calculate the appropriate sample size. 
Brown and Venkatesh (2005) reported an adjusted R2  value of .74, Davis (1989) reported 
an adjusted R2  value of .79, Lee (2009) reported an adjusted R2  value of .80 and Hong et 
al. Hong (2011) reported an R2  value of .51.  
Another method for determining sample size within PLS-SEM is known as the 10 
times rule, which indicates that the sample should be the larger of 10 times the largest 
number of formative indicators used to measure a single construct or 10 times the largest 
number of structural paths directed towards a particular construct in the structural model 
(Barclay et al., 1995; Chin & Newsted, 1999). Applying this rule of thumb to the research 
model results in 50 (10 x 5 reflective indicators) samples needed to adequately provide 






Data analysis of the Delphi panel consisted of an examination of the responses to the 
initial round of semi-open questions regarding the proposed structural and measurement 
model as well as the survey instrument and three rounds of structured questions to verify 
previous consensus and finalize the model and survey instrument (Brady, 2015). Data 
analysis of the survey instrument was initially used to ensure the suitability of the data 
collected, with an emphasis on non-response bias and common method bias (Chin et al., 
2012; MacKenzie et al., 2011) as well as obvious data integrity issues such as patterning, 
straight lining and missing data. Partial Least Squares Structured Equation Modeling 
(PLS-SEM) is an accepted method within IS research and is an appropriate method to be 
used for the analysis due to the theoretical nature of the study as well as the conceptual 
model (Hair et al., 2010; Khan et al., 2019). Analysis consisted of an examination of the 
measurement models to ensure suitability of the constructs and an evaluation of the 
structural model as proposed by the hypothesis of this study (Gefen et al., 2011; Hair et 
al., 2010). 
Resources 
This research study required the following resources: 
 Expert panel for Delphi Method: Phase 1 of the research required an expert 
panel of nine cybersecurity and information systems Subject Matter Experts 
with diverse backgrounds and expertise within the field, as well as varying in 
age and education. 




 Access to employee population: Approval from the IRB at Nova Southeastern 
University was obtained and is shown in Appendix A. 
 Typeform: This is a multiplatform and versatile online data collection tool, 
which will be used to collect surveys. 
 Microsoft Sharepoint: A web-based collaborative platform that was used to 
host a mirror of the survey on U.S. government systems.  
 Microsoft Excel: A spreadsheet application used to compile and present 
sample demographics. 
 Statistical analysis tool: Following data collection, SmartPLS Version 3.3.3, 
was used to conduct PLS-SEM analysis of the data and GNU PSPP Version 
1.4.1-g79ad47 was used to conduct factor analysis. 
Summary  
This chapter consists of an overview of the quantitative research design and 
methodology. The research design is an exploratory model developing theory, based on 
established literature. The population is described as members of the United States 
Intelligence Community that uses Open Source Intelligence as part of their work, located 
throughout the world. The size of the study population is not publicly disclosed, but the 
response rate of 240 valid responses exceeds the minimum of 50 valid survey responses 
needed to provide sufficient statistical power (Hair et al., 2017) for analysis. Data were 
collected was obtained through the use of online tools and Web-based survey instruments. 
Collected data were analyzed through the use of SmartPLS Version 3.3.3, a statistical 








This chapter provides the results of a quantitative analysis of the data, as well as the 
demographics of the responses and the sample population. Analysis was performed on a 
sample of 240 cases from the data, reduced from 243 cases due to missed attention check 
indicators. The first section provides a demographic overview of the respondents. The 
subsequent sections detail the quantitative analysis of the data, consistent with the 
process for assessing PLS-SEM data identified by Hair et al. (2017). Beginning with the 
assessment of the measurement model, reflective constructs were assessed for convergent 
and discriminant validity as well as internal consistency. The measurement model was 
also assessed for common method bias. The structural model was then assessed for effect 
size and significance, followed by an assessment of the explanatory power and predictive 
relevance of the model. These analytical results are presented, followed by the results of 
the hypotheses of this study.  
The quantitative results of the study were developed using SmartPLS version 3.3.3 
(Ringle et al., 2015) for PLS-SEM analysis, and GNU PSPP Version 1.4.1 (GNU Project, 
2020) was used to conduct the Harmon one-factor test for common method variance. The 
consistent PLS (PLSc) algorithm, with all latent variables connected to ensure consistent 
results, was used for PLS-SEM analysis as well as PLS bootstrapping, as recommend 
when the research model contains all reflective constructs (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015; 
Hair et al., 2017; Ringle et al., 2015). The PLSc algorithm ensures consistent results with 




2014; Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015; Dijkstra & Schermelleh-Engel, 2014). The sample 
demographics were assembled using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Excel, 2020)   
 
Sample Demographics 
The details of the survey responses are listed in Table 3, including the number of 
surveys started, the number of surveys in which the participant declined to continue or 
did not meet the inclusion criteria, as well as those rejected due to a missed attention 
check question. Due to the design of the survey software, missing or incomplete data 
were included in the dropout/declined numbers. The remainder of the usable responses 
were examined for data integrity issues such as patterning or straight lining, with no 
issues found.  
Table 3 
 
Response Rate Details 
    Count Percentage 
Surveys Started   272 100% 
Dropouts/Declined  29 10.66% 
Completed responses  243 89.34% 
Rejected due to missed attention check 3 1.10% 
Usable responses   240 88.24% 
 
Table 4 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified gender. 
The responses indicate a fairly equitable distribution of both the IC population and the 







Participant Gender (N=240) 
Gender Count Percentage 
Female 105 43.8% 
Male 134 55.8% 
Other 1 0.4% 
 
Table 5 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified age 
category. The responses indicate a normal distribution of participants. 
Table 5 
 
Participant Age (N=240) 
Age Count Percentage 
18-24 16 6.7% 
25-34 49 20.4% 
35-44 83 34.6% 
45-54 61 25.4% 
55-64 20 8.3% 
65+ 11 4.6% 
 
Table 6 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified ethnicity. 
The responses indicate a moderate bias towards those identifying as White or Caucasian, 
comprising of 72.5% of respondents, followed by those identifying as Black or African 







Participant Ethnicity (N=240) 
Ethnicity Count Percentage 
Asian or Pacific Islander 14 5.8% 
Black or African American 22 9.2% 
Hispanic or Latino 15 6.3% 
Native American or American Indian 4 1.7% 
Other 11 4.6% 
White or Caucasian  174 72.5% 
 
Table 7 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified length of 
service in the Intelligence Community. Approximately half (48.8%) of the respondents 
have served in the IC for 1-10 years, about one-third (27.9%) have served 11-20 years 
and 23.3% have served for more than 20 years.  
Table 7 
 
Participant Length of Service (N=240) 
Length of IC Service Count Percentage 
1 to 3 years 28 11.7% 
4 to 5 years 46 19.2% 
6 to 10 years 43 17.9% 
11 to 20 years 67 27.9% 
More than 20 years 56 23.3% 
 
Table 8 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified levels of 
education attainment. It should be noted that the majority of civilian positions within the 
IC require a minimum education level, usually a Bachelor’s degree (Career Fields | 








Participant Education (N=240) 
Education Count Percentage 
High School Diploma/GED or equivalent 9 3.8% 
Associate Degree (e.g., AA, AS) 5 2.1% 
Bachelor's Degree (e.g., BA, BS) 102 42.5% 
Master's Degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA) 117 48.8% 
Professional Degree (e.g., MD, DDS, JD) 1 0.4% 
Doctorate Degree (e.g., PhD, EdD) 6 2.5% 
 
Table 9 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified seniority, 
as identified by categorized pay grade or rank, within the IC.  Government Service (GS) 
grades range between 1 and 15, with higher grades indicating increased responsibility and 
pay, followed by executive level positions including Senior Executive Service (SES) and 
Defense Intelligence Senior Leader (DISL) (US Office of Personnel Management, 2009). 
Military grades range from E-1 to E-9 for enlisted personnel and O-1 to O-10 for officer 
personnel. Contractor personnel do not have assigned grades, but work under the 




Participant Seniority (N=240) 
Pay Grade or Rank Count Percentage 
GS 1-5 or E1 to E4 (MIL) 3 1.3% 
GS 6-9 or E5 to E7 (MIL) 25 10.4% 
GS 10-12 or E8-O2 (MIL) 51 21.3% 
GS 13-14 or O3 - O4 (MIL) 130 54.2% 
GS 15 or O5-O6 (MIL) 28 11.7% 






Measurement Model Analysis  
Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity of Reflective Constructs 
This study reports both Cronbach’s α and composite reliability score in the evaluation 
of the internal consistency for the reflective constructs. Cronbach’s α has been 
traditionally used as the primary method of assessing internal consistency and reliability, 
with scores greater than 0.7 indicating reliability of the measured construct (Bonett & 
Wright, 2015; Hair et al., 2017) but as discussed in Chapter 3, the relevance of 
Cronbach’s α has been questioned (Peters, 2018). Composite reliability is a preferred 
measure for internal consistency when using PLS-SEM analysis, wherein scores above 
0.7 indicate reliability and scores above 0.9 indicate possible multicollinearity within the 
construct (Hair et al., 2017). The requirement that the dimensions of reflective constructs 
be related, or convergent validity, are assessed in this study through average variance 
extracted (AVE), with scores greater than 0.5 indicating support. All of the scores for 
Cronbach’s α, composite reliability and AVE indicate internal consistency and convergent 
validity, respectively, of the reflective constructs and are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10  
 
 
Composite and Convergent Validity (N=240)  







Intention to Use Enterprise 0.770 0.769 0.528 
Intention to Use Private 0.801 0.803 0.577 
PEUEI 0.864 0.868 0.580 
PEUPI 0.863 0.865 0.567 
PUEI 0.865 0.864 0.516 
PUPI 0.887 0.886 0.566 





Discriminant Validity of Reflective Constructs 
Heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio is a measure of discriminant validity to determine 
if the constructs of a reflective model are empirically distinct from each other, and is 
recommended as a robust measure of discriminant validity (Ab Hamid et al., 2017), 
especially when conducting PLS-SEM analysis (Hair et al., 2017). Generally, HTMT 
ratios should not exceed 0.85, or 0.9 if the reflective constructs are closely related (Hair 
et al., 2017; Henseler et al., 2015). None of the HTMT ratios reported in Table 11 exceed 
the recommended cutoff of 0.85. 
Table 11      
 
     







Private PEUEI PEUPI PUEI PUPI PoRE 
Intention to Use Private 0.498             
PEUEI 0.106 0.116       
PEUPI 0.466 0.567 0.158      
PUEI 0.164 0.107 0.560 0.275     
PUPI 0.390 0.699 0.208 0.658 0.330    
PoRE 0.641 0.445 0.120 0.379 0.125 0.326   
 
Common Method Variance 
Common method variance (CMV) is defined by Richardson et al. (2009, p. 763) as the 
“systematic error variance shared among variables measured with and introduced as a 
function of the same method and/or source”, and is a potential source of bias when the 
same respondent provides both independent and dependent data collected on the same 
instrument, a common trait of survey based research (Eichhorn, 2014). In significant 
levels, this variance can lead to common method bias (CMB), indicating the design of the 




validity of the study. One useful measure to identify disproportionate CMV is Harman’s 
One-Factor Test, also known as Harmon’s Single-Factor Test, which identifies the 
variance explained by a single factor, including all indicators within the model and if the 
variance is <50%, excessive CMV does not exist (Tehseen et al., 2017). As shown in 
Table 12, 27.50% of the variance is explained by one factor, well below the threshold of 
>50% which would indicate CMB and threaten the validity of the study. 
Table 12  
 
 
Harmon's One-Factor Test  
Component Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
Variance % 
1.00 28.27 27.50% 27.50% 
 
Structural Model Analysis 
Following the validation of the measurement model, the structural model is assessed, 
beginning with the evaluation of the statistical significance of the diverse paths of the 
model. The effect size of each path coefficient, which estimates how one construct 
contributes to the explanatory power of other constructs, represented using the f2 
measure, is then reported (Cohen, 1992; Hair et al., 2017). Next, the size and significance 
of each endogenous construct is evaluated using the R2 coefficient of determination and 
the predictive relevance of the endogenous constructs evaluated using the Q2 measure. 
The final section evaluates the theorized hypotheses of this study and accepts or rejects 
the hypotheses based on the analysis of the structural model. The results of the PLS-SEM 
analysis are displayed in Figure 4, which shows the composite reliability of the constructs 










Path Model Coefficient Significance and Effect Size 
The initial evaluation of the statistical significance of the diverse paths of the model 
was conducted using an analysis of the variance inflation factors (VIF), which assesses 
collinearity (Hair et al., 2017). Constructs with high collinearity, as shown by VIF values 
exceeding five, indicate significant correlation between multiple predictor variables as 
well as redundancy (Hair et al., 2017). As shown in Table 13, the path model VIF values 
fall well below the threshold of 5, indicating a lack of collinearity between constructs. 
Table 13      
 
     





Use Private PEUEI PEUPI PUEI PUPI PoRE 
PEUEI 1.635 1.635   1.018    
PEUPI 2.045 2.045    1.177   
PUEI 1.690 1.690       
PUPI 1.929 1.929       
PoRE 1.225 1.225 1.000 1.000 1.018 1.177   
 
Path model coefficients (β) were evaluated, which represent the hypothesized 
relationships between and among the constructs and range from -1 to 1 (Hair et al., 2017). 
Effect sizes (f2) are also assessed, as they provide a method of determining the impact an 
exogenous construct has on endogenous constructs. According to Cohen (1992), 
assessing effect sizes (f2 ) should follow these guidelines: values <0.02 indicate no effect; 
values between 0.02 and <0.15 represent a small effect; values between 0.15 and <0.35 
represent a medium effect and values of 0.35 of greater indicate a large effect on the 
exogenous latent variables.  
Statistical significance was further evaluated following the PLS-SEM bootstrapping 




determine significance as PLS-SEM is a non-parametric statistical method wherein there 
is no assumption that the underlying data are statistically distributed (Hair et al., 2017). 
Bootstrapping was calculated using the SmartPLS consistent PLS (PLSc) method with 
maximum iterations, complete bootstrapping complexity, Bias-Corrected and Accelerated 
(BCa) bootstrap as the confidence interval method, using 5000 samples with a two tailed 
test type at a 0.05 significance level, consistent with recommendations by Hair et al. 
(2017). The bootstrapping process provided a calculation of the t values, which were 
assessed using a two-tailed basis due to the non-directional nature of hypotheses within 
this study, allowing for an evaluation of the significance levels. Critical values for two-
tailed t values at a 90% significance level are 1.645, 95% significance level is 1.96 and at 
a 99% significance level, 2.57 (Hair et al., 2017). Path model coefficients (β), two-tailed t 





Table 14   
 
  
Path Model Coefficients (N=240)   
Inner Path Model β t Values f2 p Values 
PEUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.033 0.362 0.001 0.718 
PEUEI -> Intention to Use Private -0.037 0.457 0.002 0.648 
PEUEI -> PUEI 0.569 10.319 0.474+++ <0.001*** 
PEUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.234 2.204 0.050+ 0.028* 
PEUPI -> Intention to Use Private 0.151 1.494 0.027+ 0.135 
PEUPI -> PUPI 0.619 9.309 0.584+++ <0.001*** 
PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise 0.039 0.312 0.002 0.755 
PUEI -> Intention to Use Private 0.194 2.156 0.053+ 0.031** 
PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.048 0.418 0.002 0.676 
PUPI -> Intention to Use Private 0.595 6.780 0.435+++ <0.001*** 
PoRE -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.525 6.338 0.423+++ <0.001*** 
PoRE -> Intention to Use Private 0.194 2.849 0.073+ 0.004*** 
PoRE -> PEUEI -0.133 1.731 0.018 0.084 
PoRE -> PEUPI 0.388 5.546 0.177++ <0.001*** 
PoRE -> PUEI -0.031 0.477 0.001 0.634 
PoRE -> PUPI 0.102 1.545 0.016 0.123 
Note.  *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 f2 effect size +Small ++Medium +++Large  
 
Path model coefficients (β), representing the path effect of linked constructs, provides 
an estimation of the relationship between a dependent and independent variable, wherein 
for every standard deviation change in the independent variable, the dependent variable 
will change by the path coefficient (β) standard deviations (Hair et al., 2017). The 
relationships between constructs with the highest positive β were PEUPI-PUPI (0.619), 
PUPI-Intention to Use Private (0.595), PEUEI-PUEI (0.569), PoRE-PEUPI (0.388) and 
PUEI-Intention to Use Private (0.194). The path relationships with the largest negative β 
were PoRE-Intention to Use Enterprise (-0.525) and PEUPI-Intention to Use Enterprise  
(-0.234). The path models of PEUPI-PUPI, PUPI-Intention to Use Private, PEUEI-PUEI 




PoRE-PEUPI has a medium effect size and a p value <0.001 while PEUPI-Intention to 
Use Enterprise has a small effect size and a p value <.10.  
Specific indirect effects, which evaluate the β on constructs through at least one 
additional mediating construct and estimate the relevance of significant relationships 
(Hair et al., 2017), were analyzed using SmartPLS software and is shown in Table 15. 
The most significant effect paths were PEUPI-PUPI-Intention to Use Private (0.368), 
PoRE-PEUPI-PUPI (0.240), PoRE-PEUPI-PUPI-Intention to Use Private (0.143) and  
PEUEI-PUEI-Intention to Use Private (0.111). 
Table 15 
 




PEUPI -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Private 0.368 
PoRE -> PEUPI -> PUPI 0.240 
PoRE -> PEUPI -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Private 0.143 
PEUEI -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Private 0.111 
PoRE -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Private 0.061 
PoRE -> PEUPI -> Intention to Use Private 0.059 
PEUEI -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise 0.022 
PoRE -> PEUEI -> Intention to Use Private 0.005 
PoRE -> PEUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise 0.004 
PoRE -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.001 
PoRE -> PEUEI -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.003 
PoRE -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.005 
PoRE -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Private -0.006 
PoRE -> PEUPI -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.011 
PoRE -> PEUEI -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Private -0.015 
PEUPI -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.030 
PoRE -> PEUEI -> PUEI -0.076 




Total effects, the sum of direct and indirect effects, represent both the direct effect of 
one construct on another as well as the indirect effects of mediating constructs (Hair et 
al., 2017; Sarstedt et al., 2019) and is shown in Table 16. 
Table 16      
 
     







Private PEUEI PEUPI PUEI PUPI PoRE 
PEUEI -0.011 0.073   0.569    
PEUPI -0.264 0.520    0.619   
PUEI 0.039 0.194       
PUPI -0.048 0.595       
PoRE -0.632 0.441 -0.133 0.388 -0.107 0.342   
 
Explanatory Power and Predictive Relevance 
Within this study, two endogenous constructs existed: Intention to Use Private 
[Internet] and Intention to Use Enterprise [Internet]. The quality of the structural model 
was assessed to identify the explanatory power and predictive relevance of these 
endogenous constructs and is detailed in Table 17. Predictive power is calculated as the 
coefficient of determination (R2), which is the “squared correlation between a specific 
endogenous construct’s actual  and predicted values” (Hair et al., 2017, p. 198), which is 
an in-sample prediction. To avoid bias towards more complex models, an adjusted 
coefficient of determination is used, where the exogenous constructs relative to the 
sample size are adjusted, systematically compensating for nonsignificant exogenous 
constructs which would otherwise increase explained variance (Hair et al., 2017). For 
both R2 and Adjusted R2, values range from 0 to 1, with increasing values indicating 




identified as substantial with values of 0.75, moderate with values of 0.5 and weak with 
values of 0.25 (Hair et al., 2017, 2019).  
Out-of-sample predictive power, or predictive relevance, is assessed through Stone-
Geisser’s Q2 value, which predicts data not found within the model estimation (Geisser, 
1974; Hair et al., 2017; Stone, 1974). Q2 values are developed using a blindfolding 
technique where data points in the endogenous constructs are systematically and 
iteratively removed and the remaining data are used to predict the missing data; the true 
values are then compared to the predicted values to develop the Q2 measure (Hair et al., 
2017). Q2 values that exceed 0 are considered to have some predictive relevance, with 
values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 representing small, medium and large predictive relevance 
for reflective endogenous constructs (Hair et al., 2017).  
Table 17  
 
 
Explanatory Power and Predictive Relevance  
  R2 Adjusted R2 Q2 
Intention to Use Enterprise 0.467*** 0.498*** 0.207 
Intention to Use Private 0.578*** 0.598*** 0.295 
Note.  *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01   
 
The structural model in this study provides a weak coefficient of determination (R2) 
for the endogenous construct Intention to Use Enterprise (0.467) and a moderate 
coefficient of determination for Intention to Use Private (0.578), both of which are 
statistically significant at p<0.01. Both constructs have medium predictive value with Q2 







The results of the hypothesized relationships of the research model are presented in 
this section. The hypotheses, associated predictor paths, path coefficient (β), significance 
(t value and associated p values) and the result of the hypotheses are show in Table 18. 
Structural paths not associated with hypotheses are not displayed and will be discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
Table 18    
 
   
Hypotheses Results (N=240)    
Label Predictor β t Values p Values Result 
H1a PoRE -> PEUPI 0.388 5.546 <0.001*** Supported 
H1b PoRE -> PEUEI -0.133 1.731 0.084 Not Supported 
H2a PoRE -> PUPI 0.102 1.545 0.123 Not Supported 
H2b PoRE -> PUEI -0.031 0.477 0.634 Not Supported 
H3a PoRE -> Intention to Use Private 0.194 2.849 0.004*** Supported 
H3b PoRE -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.525 6.338 <0.001*** Supported 
H4a PEUPI -> PUPI 0.619 9.309 <0.001*** Supported 
H4b PEUEI -> PUEI 0.569 10.319 <0.001*** Supported 
H5a PEUPI -> Intention to Use Private 0.151 1.494 0.135 Not Supported 
H5b PEUEI -> Intention to Use Private -0.037 0.457 0.648 Not Supported 
H5c PEUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.234 2.204 0.028** Supported 
H5d PEUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.033 0.362 0.718 Not Supported 
H6a PUPI -> Intention to Use Private 0.595 6.780 <0.001*** Supported 
H6b PUEI -> Intention to Use Private 0.194 2.156 0.031** Not Supported 
H6c PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise -0.048 0.418 0.676 Not Supported 
H6d PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise 0.039 0.312 0.755 Not Supported 
Note.  *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01     
 
The majority of theorized hypotheses were not supported for lack of statistical 
significance, including: H1b, H2a, H3b, H5a, H5b, H5d, H6c and H6d. Hypothesis 6b: 
“Perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access negatively influences employees’ 




supported because while it is statistically significant, the path coefficient indicates a 
positive effect, contrary to the hypothesis.  
The following seven hypotheses were supported and are displayed in Figure 5:  
H1a: Perception of risk will have a positive effect on the perceived ease of use of 
private Internet access. 
H3a: The perception of enterprise risk will have a direct relationship with the 
intention to conduct Internet based research using Private Internet access for OSINT 
related work activities. 
H3b: The perception of enterprise risk will have a direct relationship with the 
intention to conduct Internet based research using Enterprise Internet access for 
OSINT related work activities. 
H4a: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access positively influences the 
perceived usefulness of private Internet access. 
H4b: Perceived ease of use of enterprise Internet access positively influences the 
perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access. 
H5c: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access negatively influences 
employees’ intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work  
activities. 
H6a: Perceived usefulness of private Internet access positively influences employees’ 













The goal of this study was to empirically assess the effects perception of risk of using 
enterprise provided Internet access has on the ease of use and usefulness of both private 
and enterprise Internet access, and the intention to use private or enterprise systems for 
OSINT related work activities. To accomplish this, participants completed a survey. This 
chapter provides the results of the quantitative analysis of the demographics of the 
responses and the study population, the measurement and structural models, and the 
results of the hypotheses. The data were analyzed using SmartPLS software to conduct 
PLS-SEM analysis and GNU PSPP software to assess for the presence of common 
method bias, which provided measures that confirmed the validity and reliability of the 
measurement and structural model, as well as the significance and effects of path 
coefficients in the model. Based on these analyses, seven hypotheses were supported and 







Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Overview 
This chapter includes conclusions drawn from the findings of the analytical results 
provided in Chapter 4, in light of the literature reviewed, followed by discussion of the 
study’s limitations, strengths and weaknesses. Next, implications of the research on 
organizational Internet restrictions and usage are discussed. The final sections of this 
chapter focus on recommendations for future research opportunities and a summary. 
 
Conclusions 
The goal of this research was to assess the influence the perception of risk has on the 
behavioral intention and use behavior of personally-owned Internet devices and access to 
conduct open-source research among members of the United States Intelligence 
Community. Based on the results of this study, the perception of risk when using 
enterprise provided Internet devices and access has a significant negative impact on the 
intention of using enterprise provided devices (H3b: β=-0.525, p<0.001, f2 >0.35). 
Inversely, the perception of risk when using enterprise provided Internet devices and 
access on the intention to use private devices was less robust, but with a positive effect 
(H3a: β=0.194, p<0.01, f2 >0.02). These results comport well to Lee’s (2009) prior work 
evaluating the impact of risk on intention to use and support the proposition of the study 




use their own Internet and devices to conduct work related tasks, which increases the risk 
of information compromise (Garba et al., 2015; Hovav & Putri, 2016). 
The perceived ease of use of both private and enterprise Internet devices and access 
largely had no statistical effect on the intention to use (H5a, H5b, H5d), with one 
exception. The perceived ease of use of private Internet had a negative effect on the 
intention to use enterprise Internet (H5c: β=-0.234, p<0.05, f2 >0.02). These results may 
have been influenced by the relatively well educated and professionally experienced 
nature of the sample population; a population that has used both enterprise and personal 
information systems for significant lengths of time and in a variety of settings. The 
perception of risk on the perceived ease of use and usefulness of both private and 
enterprise Internet (H1b, H2a, H2b) provides a similar result – with the exception of 
perception of risk on perceived ease of use of private Internet (H1a: β=0.388, p<0.001, f2 
>0.15). The fact that perceived risk only influenced the perceived ease of use of private 
Internet may be the manifestation of burdensome or difficult policies or procedures when 
using enterprise provided Internet.  
The perceived usability of both private and enterprise Internet on the intention to use 
(H6b, H6c, H6d) follows the same pattern, with the exception that the perceived usability 
of private Internet strongly affects the intention to use private Internet positively (H6a: 
β=0.595, p<0.001, f2 >0.35). These results represent that a preference is shown towards 
using private Internet because it is perceived as being easier to use, more useful, and less 
risky than using enterprise provided Internet and devices. The positive relationship 




Internet and devices represented in hypotheses H4a and H4b are well supported by the 
literature.  
One of the most significant challenges facing this study was that it relies on reported 
behavior vice actual behavior. As discussed previously, responses can be biased towards 
socially desirable answers (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), and significant variability exists 
between reported actions and their actual frequency of use (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). 
Additionally, self-selection response bias may be present due to the fact respondents 
chose whether to participate or not. While this study supported the central research idea 
that as the perception of risk increases when using enterprise Internet and devices 
individuals may choose to forgo using these devices in favor of their own private Internet 
and devices, the scope and scale of these relationships may be exaggerated or minimized 
due to the reliance on survey data. Another challenge was the number of participants and 
the inability to validate, beyond the use of qualification questions and disseminating 
requests to complete the survey within Intelligence Community enclaves, that the 
participants were in fact members of the IC due to the anonymized method of data 
collection. The number of participants (N=240) exceeds the minimum threshold of 50 for 
statistical power and confidence (Barclay et al., 1995; Chin & Newsted, 1999), but 
additional samples could provide more robust generalizability. One of the strengths of 
this study was the high degree of internal consistency and reliability, with every construct 
indicating Cronbach's α and Composite Reliability scores exceeding 0.750, representing a 
lack of multicollinearity. Another strength was the diversity of gender, age, and 






This study provides insights into the intention of employees to use private Internet and 
devices to conduct work related tasks when enterprise provided Internet and devices are 
considered risky, cumbersome or difficult to use. The demarcation of private devices and 
Internet from enterprise Internet and devices within the milieu of the sample population, 
as well as the likelihood of pernicious and persistent attempts to obtain insights into 
Internet usage by adversaries is likely to be an unusual circumstance for most 
organizations. However, the threat posed by the incidental or accidental release of 
information when users avoid using provided enterprise information systems in order to 
more efficiently access information applies to organizations of all sizes and types.  
The results of this study provide support to the concept that organizations must do 
more to balance threats to information systems with threats to information security. The 
imposition of safeguards to protect networks and systems, as well as employee misuse of 
information technology resources, may unwittingly incentivize users to use their own 
Internet and devices instead, where enterprise safeguards and protections are absent. This 
incentive is particularly pronounced when organizations increase the perceived threat of 
risk to users, whether intentional or inadvertent, and when the perception of the ease of 
use and usefulness of private Internet devices is high. This study also provides insights 
into user risk perception, allowing organizations to make informed decisions as to what 
Internet use policies are appropriate and which policies induce risk that enterprise 






This study, examining what effect the perception of risk has on the intention of 
individuals to choose between enterprise or personal Internet and devices to do work 
related tasks, provides an incremental advancement in the literature of information 
systems. Based on the analysis of this study, as well as the study’s exploratory nature, 
several recommendations are provided to further this line of research. 
 The first recommendation is to conduct appropriately tailored versions of this study 
across a broad array of organizations, including government entities at the federal, state, 
and local levels, within academic institutions, and private organizations to assess whether 
the risk effects are broadly generalizable. Further empirical studies would provide 
additional support to the theoretical concepts of risk developed in this study and its 
impact on individual choices selecting between an enterprise and private environment. 
The second recommendation is to incorporate the perception of risk of using private 
Internet and devices as an additional exogenous construct into the research model, which 
would facilitate cross comparison of the effect risk has on intention to use behaviors as 
well as ease of use and usefulness measures. The third recommendation is to assess 
whether moderating variables derived from the UTAUT model, such as age, gender, and 
experience (Venkatesh et al., 2003; M. Williams et al., 2015), have a significant effect. 
The fourth recommendation is to assess whether measures of facilitating conditions for 
both enterprise and personally owned Internet access have a significant effect on 
intention to use behaviors, especially when selecting between organizational and private 






Securing information systems against external threats is often the primary motivation 
of information security professionals (T. Brown, 2018; Gordon & Loeb, 2002; Wang, 
2019), but protecting critical information, as well as systems, is a necessary and essential 
component of a holistic organizational security effort. When critical information is 
potentially exposed by non-malicious insiders who use personal devices to conduct work 
related tasks outside of the organizational information systems infrastructure, the 
organization loses both visibility of the potential loss and is unable to provide appropriate 
safeguards to prevent information compromise. When organizations increase the 
perception of risk when using enterprise systems and networks to conduct work related 
activities, or impose restrictions that impede the usefulness or ease of use of information 
systems (Gundu & Flowerday, 2012; Hovav & Putri, 2016), they are inadvertently 
incentivizing users to bypass these limitations and use personally owned devices and 
Internet (Colvin, 2016), potentially increasing the risk of information compromise.  
This study demonstrated that increases in the perception of risk when using enterprise 
provided devices and Internet significantly affects the intention to use personally owned 
devices and Internet to conduct work related tasks. It also demonstrated that the perceived 
usefulness of personally owned devices, compared to the usefulness of enterprise 
provided devices, plays a significant role in intention to use behaviors.  
The study’s limitations, strengths and weaknesses were identified and discussed. The 
study’s implications, including the recognition that organizations must carefully balance 
threats to information systems with threats to information security and imposing 




work introduce the possibility that outside resources may be used, such as personally 
owned devices. Finally, several recommendations for future research opportunities were 
provided. As a result of this study, the extant gap in the literature to understand the 
motivations and choices employees make to choose between enterprise systems and 











Appendix B: Delphi Survey Questionnaire 
Dear Panel Members,  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the review of my survey! Your views, thoughts, 
opinions, and suggestions are very appreciated. I know each of you are very busy and I 
thank you for your time and attention.  
Some background:  
My dissertation research is incorporating a survey looking at how members of the 
Intelligence Community obtain open source information from the Internet, and how the 
perception of risk influences these choices. The theoretical framework is derived from the 
two primary “technology acceptance use” theories and is attached to this email to help 
provide context.  
The survey questions are also derived from other validated studies and are related to each 
of the constructs being reviewed. The survey includes some additional features to help 
ensure validity and consistency, such as attention check questions as well as a few 
questions completely unrelated to the study to help identify and minimize common 
method bias, which is when the way the survey is administered affects the results. Several 
demographic questions complete the survey, which should take on average about 20 
minutes to finish.   
Instructions:  
I have attached a document that contains the survey as well as annotations and 
background for each set of questions. You can also preview the survey as it will be 
presented here: https://tp877.typeform.com/to/fOqHuzUe  
Please review the wording, phrasing and sequence of the questions, the style of the 
survey, and any other factor that could be misinterpreted, cause confusion, or cause 
respondents to answer the survey in ways other than which is intended. The goal is the 
ensure that the survey questions are clear, unambiguous, and easily answered by the study 
population with clarity.  
As you identify any issues or areas needing clarification, please identify the question 
number (and sub-question as applicable) as this will help me ensure that the issue is 
addressed.  You can also use the document and make your comments there (Please use 
another color font for text) 
In order to ensure your confidentiality and to encourage open communication, each 
participant is receiving a blind copy of this email. Please reply to this email with your 
responses, questions, or anything else you may require.  








Nova Southeastern University 
 
The survey questions are examining the influence of perceived risk on the use of 
personally owned Internet devices by U.S. Intelligence Community analysts conducting 
Open Source research and are derived from previous validates studies. The study 
questions are listed below and are numbered for easy reference. Text that appears in the 
survey is indicated by BOLD text.  
Annotations will be italicized and are not present in the survey itself and are provided to 
assist you in reviewing the survey.  All questions are mandatory, including demographic 
questions. An attention check question is located within the survey as is a series of 
questions to assess and control for common method bias, which helps to ensure that the 
format of the survey itself doesn’t influence the responses. 
 
0. Welcome Screen 
1. Before we begin, we want you to be informed about the nature of the study, 
who is conducting it, and any risks. A full printable version of this consent 
form can be downloaded here: http://ow.ly/o45Y50BqoWO 
 
If you choose not to participate, please close your browser. 
 
Do you agree to participate in this study?   
 
Respondents can choose between I Agree and I Disagree. If they choose Disagree, 
the survey will exit. 
 
2. First, we need to make sure you are part of the population we are trying to 
reach with this survey. These two questions are YES/NO and serve to verify the 
sample population. If either question is responded to with a NO, the survey will 
exit. If both are yes, the survey will continue. 
 
a. Are you a member of the United States Intelligence Community?  
b. Do you use Open Source Intelligence as part of your work in the 
Intelligence Community? (Open Source Intelligence is defined as 
“…intelligence produced from publicly available information that is 




appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific 
intelligence requirement”)  
 
Excellent! You have been qualified as a member of the study population. This 
study uses scales to measure your opinion on various questions. Please select 
the response that most accurately captures how much you agree or disagree 
with a particular statement. 
The survey will now begin. 
As a reminder, all answers are confidential and your participation is 
completely voluntary. 
 
3. The first section focuses on your thoughts on Information Security. (All 
responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale ranging from Strongly Disagree 
to Strongly Agree. In each question, the source of the Internet is bolded to call 
attention to the difference between questions.) 
a. I would feel safe using my personal device/Internet to do research on 
the same topics I research for work 
b. I would feel safe using my work provided devices/Internet to do 
Internet research 
c. I’m worried that using my private devices and Internet to research 
work topics could cause me problems. 
d. I’m worried that using work provided devices and Internet to 
research work topics could cause me problems. 
e. I feel secure using my personal Internet to research publicly available 
websites from other countries. 
f. I feel secure using work provided Internet to research publicly 
available websites from other countries. 
g. I am more like to use my ▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁ Internet access for 
Open Source research in the next two months. (This question has two 
options) 
i. Personal 
ii. Work Provided 
 
4. Great, now let's focus how easy (or hard) it is to use your personally owned 
devices/Internet or work provided devices/Internet for Internet research.  We 
will begin with your own Internet access and devices you use at home. (All 
responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale ranging from Strongly Disagree 
to Strongly Agree. In each question, the source of the Internet is bolded to call 




a. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related 
Internet research, learning how to operate the Internet browser would 
be easy for me. 
b. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related 
Internet research, I would find it easy to find the information I was 
looking for. 
c. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related 
Internet research, my interaction with the applications I need to use 
would be clear, effective and flexible. 
d. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related 
Internet research, it would be easy for me to become skilled at open 
source research. 
e. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related 
Internet research, I would find that the tools I need are easy to use. 
f. Within the next two months, I am likely to use my own Internet access 
and devices at home to do Open Source work. 
 
The following questions are asking about enterprise (work) provided 
Internet access and devices: 
 
g. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for 
work related Internet research, learning how to operate the Internet 
browser would be easy for me. 
h. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for 
work related Internet research, I would find it easy to find the 
information I was looking for. 
i. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for 
work related Internet research, my interaction with the applications I 
need to use would be clear, effective and flexible. 
j. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for 
work related Internet research, it would be easy for me to become 
skilled at open source research. 
k. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for 
work related Internet research, I would find that the tools I need are 
easy to use. 
l. Within the next two months, I am likely to use enterprise (work) 
provided Internet access and devices to do Open Source work. 
 
5. Now, we want to know how useful you find using your own devices and 
Internet is compared to how useful your find work provided devices and 
Internet is when doing Open Source research. (All responses are collected via 
a 7-point Likert Scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. In each 






Over halfway there now, keep it up! 
 
a. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work 
related Internet research enables me to accomplish Internet research 
more quickly. 
b. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work 
related Internet research improves my job performance. 
c. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work 
related Internet research increases my productivity. 
d. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work 
related Internet research enhances my effectiveness. 
e. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work 
related Internet research makes it easier to do my job. 
f. I find using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices 
useful to do work related Internet research. 
g. We know there are a bunch of questions. Please select Strongly Agree 
for this question. (This question is designed to ensure the participant is 
paying attention to the questions). 
h. I intend to use my enterprise (work) provided Internet access to do 
Open Source research within the next two months 
i. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet 
research enables me to accomplish Internet research more quickly. 
j. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet 
research improves my job performance. 
k. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet 
research increases my productivity 
l. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet 
research enhances my effectiveness. 
m. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet 
research makes it easier to do my job. 
n. Using my own Internet access at home is useful to do work related 
Internet research. 
o. I intend to use my personal Internet access to do Open Source 
research within the next two months 
 
6. This section is asking how likely you are to conduct Open Source research in 
the near future. (These two questions are included to ensure internal consistency 
and validity of the survey. All responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale 
ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. In each question, the source of 




a. I expect that I will use my work provided Internet access for Open 
Source research in the next two months. 
b. I expect that I will use my personal Internet access for Open Source 
research in the next two months. 
 
7. This section is asking about how you are doing and your satisfaction with life. 
(This section helps to address Common Method Bias and are completely unrelated 
to the study. Responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale) 
a. In most ways, my life is close to my ideal. 
b. So far, I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
c. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 
8. This short section is asking whether you have to the tools and resources to do 
Open Source research. All responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale 
ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. In each question, the source of 
the Internet is bolded to call attention to the difference between questions.) 
a. My enterprise (work) provides the technical resources and tools I need 
to obtain Open Source information from the Internet myself. 
b. I have the knowledge necessary to use enterprise provided open 
source research tools on the Internet. 
c. I have the technical resources and tools I need to obtain Open Source 
information from the Internet using my own devices and Internet 
access. 
d. I have the knowledge necessary to use my own (not work provided) 
open source research tools on the Internet. 
 
9. OK, we are almost done! 
Just a few demographic questions to help us analyze the data.   
Don't worry - your responses are completely anonymous and will be 
aggregated by category to protect your privacy. 
a. Select the category that you belong to. 
If you are in more than one category, please identify what role you serve 
in the most. 




















d. Which of the following do you consider yourself to be? 
a. Straight, this not gay or lesbian 
b. Gay or Lesbian 
c. Bisexual 
d. Something else 
 
e. What ethnic origin do you most closely identify with? 
a. Hispanic or Latino 
b. White or Caucasian 
c. Black or African American 
d. Native American or American Indian 
e. Asian or Pacific Islander 
f. Other 
 
f. How long have you been in the Intelligence Community? 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1 to 3 years 
c. 4 to 5 years 
d. 6 to 10 years 
e. 11 to 20 years 
f. More than 20 years 
 
g. What is your pay category/grade? 
Please choose one of the following answers. If you belong to another scale 
system, i.e. contractor, pay banding, or military, please select the 
grouping that best reflects your equivalent pay/grade category 
(Members of the IC are assigned equivalent pay grades based on position and 
function and respondents will have no issues responding accurately) 
a. GS 1-5 
b. GS 6-9 
c. GS 10-12 
d. GS 13-14 
e. GS 15 





h. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed? 
a. Less than High School 
b. High School Diploma/GED or equivalent 
c. Trade or Technical Certificate 
d. Some College (no degree) 
e. Associate Degree (e.g., AA, AS) 
f. Bachelor's Degree (e.g., BA, BS) 
g. Master's Degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA) 
h. Professional Degree (e.g., MD, DDS, JD) 
i. Doctorate Degree (e.g., PhD, Ed.D) 
 
i. Indicate the mission category that best fits your position. (The primary 
function of members of the IC determines what authorities and requirements 
they are expected to comply with and what their day to day job functions are. 
This is a standard demographic question within IC based surveys) 
a. COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS - Positions that involve the 
collection and reporting of information obtained from sources by 
various means, including human and technical means, as well as 
occupations involved in intelligence operations. 
b. PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION - Occupations or positions 
that involve the conversion of information collected from various 
intelligence sources into a form that can be analyzed to produce an 
intelligence product. 
c. ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION - Occupations or positions that 
involve the preparation of a finished intelligence product from 
information obtained and processed from one or more intelligence 
sources in support of customer requirements. 
d. RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY - Occupations or positions 
that involve basic, applied, and advanced scientific and 
engineering research and development. 
e. ENTERPRISE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY - Positions that 
support the organization's information systems. This category 
includes telecommunications, network operations, operation and 
maintenance of common user systems, and computing 
infrastructure. 
f. ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT- Occupations or 
positions that involve support for the organization's human, 
financial, physical, and other resources, such as financial 
management, human resources management, and acquisition. 
g. MISSION MANAGEMENT- Occupations or positions that involve 
the coordination and integration of IC-wide intelligence 
requirements, resources, and activities. 
 
10. Exit Screen 




If you know other members of the IC that might want to help this research, 
please share the link. 
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